Lebanon's Druze and their leader Korkmaz were the main targets of Ottoman resentment

The Ottoman governors of Damascus continued to file reports about the Druze rebellion and the Druze's continued possession of firearms, contrary to orders and despite deterrent measures. Istanbul responded to these reports by continuing to issue orders to the governors of Damascus to disarm the Druze. Thus, in September 1574, a plan was prepared, and an order was issued to forces from the Ottoman fleet, in cooperation with the military forces in the province of Damascus, to carry out a broad joint attack to suppress this rebellion.

It is not known, in any case, whether this attack took place, as local sources, as previously noted, say nothing about Druze-Ottoman relations during this period. However, we know for certain that the problem persisted because consecutive orders from Istanbul to the governors of the Levant provinces continued to demand that they disarm the Druze.

These ongoing orders inform us that the Druze remained the main nerve of the rebellion and at the forefront of its leadership, or were viewed as the primary rebels against authority. The rebellion spread widely to include all Druze regions, to the point that no one came forward to obtain the tax-farming rights for these areas. Therefore, the state was forced to appoint trustees (singular: amin) to collect taxes, but they did not enjoy obedience or respect from the Druze, who sometimes claimed they had paid their taxes according to the old register (defteri Atik), while in reality, they had paid nothing. At other times, they claimed their farms were unproductive or uninhabited, but they refused to allow a judge to investigate the validity of these claims. In short, it was impossible for any form of official state presence to exist in these regions. Consequently, orders continued to be issued to provincial governors demanding the arrest and punishment of Druze chieftains (muqaddamin).

A few years later, the rebellion expanded beyond the Mount Lebanon area to include the Druze and Shiites in the Sanjak of Safed to the south. They began to cooperate with the Druze in the north, following their lead in refusing to pay the taxes owed and participating in other acts of rebellion and disobedience. One document states that the Emir of the Safed Sanjak, in cooperation with the Sipahis in the district and the Janissary Agha at the head of five hundred of his soldiers, fought the Druze in the city of Safed and its countryside, defeated them, arrested their leader Ibn Man'ar and some of his men, and then killed them. The remaining rebels were forced to hand over 600 muskets and pledge to pay their outstanding taxes. Another document mentions that the Druze and Bedouin of Safed were the core elements of the rebellion. This document clarifies that the local inhabitants, leaders, and timar holders complained against the rebels, noting that the Bedouin and Druze had seized the opportunity of the absence of provincial emirs and soldiers who were participating in the imperial campaign (foreign war) to stage an armed rebellion. Thus, it was impossible to collect even a single aqçe of taxes from that region, given that the number of muskets in the Safed Sanjak alone reached seven thousand. The document concludes with an order to arrest the rebel leaders, collect the weapons, send both the leaders and the weapons to Istanbul, and punish those who deserved it immediately.

The Druze of Lebanon remained the most prominent targets of Ottoman resentment, as did their primary leader, Korkmaz bin Ma'n, who apparently expanded his sphere of control to include the Sanjak of Safed, thereby extending the rebellion there as well. The same order previously mentioned regarding the Druze-Shiite rebellion in the Safed region stated that the “wicked” actions of Korkmaz bin Ma'n within the framework of the rebellion exceeded the “corruption and abomination” of others. Consequently, an order was issued to the Governor of Tripoli to provide aid to the Governor of Damascus to get rid of him.

However, efforts to end the Druze rebellion continued to falter, and the Druze remained in a state of open rebellion in all provinces of the Levant where they were present between 1583 and 1585. Once again, Korkmaz bin Ma'n was viewed as the most dangerous of the Druze leaders, and the Druze in general as the most rebellious group, and the governors of Damascus and Tripoli were requested to unite their forces to fight them.

In the midst of this ongoing rebellion and the Ottoman reactions to it, a letter from the former judge of Damascus to the Imperial Diwan draws attention. It states that a certain Abu Bakr ibn Rizqallah, residing in the Salihiya area of Damascus, had many contacts and dealings with the Druze, supplying them with muskets, gunpowder, and lead. The judge's letter accuses this Abu Bakr of also trading with Frankish ships, supplying them with wheat, in addition to his involvement in other related activities. The Imperial Diwan issued an order for his exile to the island of Rhodes.

In 1585, a major Ottoman punitive campaign was launched against the Druze under the command of Ibrahim Pasha, who led troops gathered from various provinces of the Levant and Anatolia. The size of the campaign indicates the severity of the situation, as the Ottoman forces present in the Levant provinces alone were unable to do what was required.

According to a local historian, the impact of this massive display of Ottoman power on the local population was so great that “the entire Arab land was terrified by it.” According to Ottoman documents and sources, as well as Arabic ones, the military operation was successful; Ibrahim Pasha managed to disarm the Druze, confiscated thousands of muskets in addition to many other weapons, collected large sums of money likely representing back taxes, killed hundreds of Druze, and sent the heads of some of them to Istanbul.

The success of this Ottoman campaign is clearly evident in the results it achieved, as well as in the absence of any reference in Ottoman documents and local sources to any further Druze disturbances until the seventeenth century.

We can draw several conclusions from the above. First: It is clear that the Druze continued to be supplied with weapons in large quantities since 1540, and some of these weapons they acquired sometimes surpassed those held by the Ottoman army. Second: Although the Druze's non-payment of taxes and non-compliance with the ban on weapon possession were sources of concern for the Ottoman authorities, what heightened their anxiety was the proximity of the Druze regions—where gun ownership was widespread—to the coast. Third: Despite the repeated mention of Korkmaz bin Ma'n as the most defiant rebel, other Druze leaders and leaders of other regions were involved in similar acts of rebellion. Fourth: Trade relations with the Franks included the prohibited trade in wheat, and perhaps other materials, in exchange for weapons. It is clear that the demand for weapons was extremely high, especially in the Druze regions of Mount Lebanon and neighboring areas like Keserwan. All these areas enjoy direct access to the coast or lie close to it.

Here we can raise two questions regarding this matter: First, who was the party supplying the weapons? Second, why were the Druze in particular more rebellious than other groups and regions?