Abdul Rahim Abu-Husayn, Professor of Ottoman History at the American University of Beirut, wrote in “Al-Hayat” newspaper, as part of a series on the relationship between the Druze and the Ottoman Empire:
The Grand Duke acted on his envoy's recommendations and obtained a pledge from Fakhr al-Din, conditional on the successful occupation of the Cypriot port of Famagusta. Fakhr al-Din pledged that if the Tuscans succeeded in capturing this port, he would open up the rest of the island and help them hold it, considering that the presence of the Tuscans in Cyprus, near him, would grant him greater security.
As previously noted, the project to occupy Cyprus by Tuscany failed, and the return of the Tuscan mission—which had negotiated the terms of the treaty with Ali Janbulad—to Florence had preceded the arrival of initial, unconfirmed reports regarding the failure of the Janbulad rebellion. Therefore, the Grand Duke urgently dispatched a naval force and an army to aid his ally Janbulad, and once again sent his mission to the Levant with secret instructions to contact Fakhr al-Din in anticipation of Janbulad reaching a desperate situation. The mission preferred this plan, convinced that Fakhr al-Din favored Christians over the Turks, whom he hated; furthermore, the Druze prince was of Christian origin.
Upon the arrival of the Tuscan mission in Cyprus, it was confirmed that Janbulad had been defeated, had fled, and had surrendered to the Ottoman Sultan. Consequently, the mission continued its way to Beirut to meet Fakhr al-Din, hand over the thousand muskets originally prepared for Janbulad, and conclude an agreement with him in which they pledged to provide military support to the Druze prince. During the negotiations, Fakhr al-Din insisted that the Pope issue an order for all Christians of the Levant to place themselves under the Prince's command and provide him with assistance whenever he requested it, under pain of excommunication. He also demanded a pledge from the Tuscans to provide him with refuge in their country if the need arose.
In January 1609, Pope Pius V addressed a letter to Fakhr al-Din, “Prince of the Druze, Nicomedia, Palestine, and Phoenicia,” praising him for his good treatment of Christians in general and the Maronites in particular, and promising him support “against the tyrannical Turks so that the Levant may be freed from their rule, and then the inhabitants may return to the true faith.” He sent gifts to the Prince along with the letter. Another letter was sent from Pius V to the Maronite Patriarch and the Maronite civil leaders, calling on them to cooperate with Fakhr al-Din.
The Druze prince's alliance with Tuscany and its importance did not escape the notice of the Ottomans or other observers interested in the region. The English traveler George Sandys, who visited the Levant in 1610 shortly after the treaty with the Tuscans was concluded, stated: It is said to be certain that the Turks will turn all their forces against him (Fakhr al-Din) the following summer (1611), which is why they are more prepared to accept peace with the Persians.
However, it seems that Fakhr al-Din was not worried by the rumor. Nevertheless, he continued to send gifts to the Sultan, gain the favor of those close to him, and express his duties of loyalty and obedience, due to his great confidence in his fortified castles, which he had well-equipped and provisioned in preparation for a long war, in addition to the protection provided by his location in the mountains. Furthermore, he had more than forty thousand professional soldiers, to whom he paid regular salaries; some were Muslims, and others were Christians. In the worst-case scenario, he had the sea to lead him to his Florentine friends. He adds: The Sultan often threatened to subdue his vassal, the Prince, but would postpone the matter jokingly by saying that he would not trouble him this year. It was not the expansion Fakhr al-Din brought about that angered him (the Sultan), but his contacts with the Florentines (the Tuscans), to whom he provided a safe haven in the port of Tyre (while claiming that the port was ruined and abandoned, and thus there was no need to defend it). They docked at the port to resupply with drinking water and purchase the most important products, and they provided him (Fakhr al-Din) with what he needed (in terms of weapons), along with the dangerous plans that were discussed and agreed upon between them (Fakhr al-Din and Tuscany), which were known to some merchants. I am fully convinced that if the opportunity arose and the Christians followed it up properly, they would shake the foundations of the Ottoman Empire's power, if not destroy it completely.
Although the alliance and friendly relations between Fakhr al-Din and Tuscany did not result in immediate, direct results, the two parties continued to cooperate after the death of Grand Duke Ferdinand I in 1609. His son and successor, Cosimo II (1609 – 1621), continued his father's policy of hostility toward the Ottomans, relying on the same allies in the Levant: the Druze, led by the Ma'nids, and the Maronites. In the meantime, in the summer of 1609, an unexpected development occurred that seemed to bode well for Tuscan projects. Prince Yahya, a claimant to the Ottoman throne, the supposed son of Sultan Mehmed III (1595 – 1603) and brother of the reigning Sultan, Ahmed I (1603 – 1617), took refuge at the Medici court, becoming the centerpiece of new crusading plans against Ottoman territories. Cosimo II immediately ordered his fleet to move to the Levant, accompanied by Prince Yahya, hoping that all rebels in Ottoman territories would join under the banner of this prince. At the same time, he wrote to Fakhr al-Din, reminding him of the friendship between himself and his late father, informing him that his fleet commander would brief him on the details of the important project currently being executed, and urging him to join this project, which would bring him and his country great benefits. However, this project never materialized, and Prince Yahya was never destined to meet Fakhr al-Din.
The good relations between Fakhr al-Din and the Papacy also continued. In a letter dated September 25, 1610, from Pope Paul V to the Maronite Patriarch Youhanna Makhlouf, the Pope recalled the Papal letter of 1510 and praised the Maronites for holding on to the true faith despite living “among heretics and infidels,” “like a rose among thorns.” He also praised Fakhr al-Din, “as we have been informed of his courage, his military prowess, his intense hostility toward the Turks, his love for you [the Maronites] and all Christians, and his pride in being the descendant of a crusader leader.” The Pope then demanded that the Patriarch nurture the friendship with Fakhr al-Din so that the latter would continue to extend his protection over the Church and the Maronite community. The letter contains an expression of the sincere hope that Fakhr al-Din's hatred for the Turks, and his love for the Maronites, would lead to his attraction to Christianity. The Pope concluded by urging the Patriarch to seize the opportunity of the Prince's readiness to embrace Christianity and to do his utmost to achieve this goal.
Just as the Maronites had strong relations with the House of Medici in Tuscany, correspondence was regularly exchanged between Florence and the seat of the Maronite Patriarch in the Qannubin Valley, northern Lebanon. The Maronites offered their help in serving Tuscan interests in the Levant in exchange for the care and affection the Medici bestowed upon them. They also exerted their good offices in the negotiations that led to the new alliance between Fakhr al-Din and Tuscany.
Fakhr al-Din, for his part, was primarily interested in the papal support that the Maronite Patriarch could secure, believing that such support would guarantee him the aid of all Catholic powers. In consultation with the Patriarch, Fakhr al-Din proposed a draft treaty, which was sent to Florence and the Papal court via the Maronite Bishop of Cyprus. In this draft, the Maronites of Mount Lebanon asserted that they had at least eight thousand Maronite soldiers awaiting the opportunity to liberate themselves from “Turkish slavery.” They also claimed the existence of Maronite fighters fully prepared in Tripoli, Aleppo, Phoenicia, Nicomedia, Jerusalem, and other areas in Palestine, as well as in Antioch. They added that they only needed arms to join the military campaign planned against the Ottomans. The draft treaty adds that Fakhr al-Din had an army of seventy thousand soldiers and had agreed with other local leaders to allow the Christian army to land in the ports of Tyre, Sidon, and Tripoli. The document also includes a plan to conquer the island of Cyprus with the help of its Christian inhabitants, including the Maronites.
It is important to note here again that when researching the biography of Fakhr al-Din in particular, and the Ma'nids in general, the Maronite historian and Patriarch who lived and wrote in the second half of the seventeenth century, Estefan El Douaihy, was certainly aware of the correspondence between his predecessors, the Pope, and the Grand Duke of Tuscany. However, he appears to have maintained a deliberate silence on the issue of the Ma'nid-Tuscan relations, and the role of the Maronites in the projects to conquer Cyprus and the Holy Land. The same was done by Fakhr al-Din's personal historian, Ahmad al-Khalidi, a contemporary witness to the events of the first three decades of the seventeenth century; he avoided mentioning the issue of the Ma'nid-Tuscan relationship, framing the subsequent conflicts between Fakhr al-Din and the Ottoman authorities as if they were the results of petty intrigues by the Prince's local opponents, as well as his opponents in the Ottoman court.